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In 2012, the European Commission celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the European 
Union ‘Single Market’. In a climate of trepidation about the future of the European project, 
the Commission organised a series of events to remind Europeans of the great strides in 
market integration since the late 1980s. However, the year itself was marked by little progress 
on internal market legislation. In the context of the on-going sovereign debt crisis and 
instability in Europe’s banking sector, the one exception to legislative inactivity was in the 
area of financial services. A series of major pieces of legislation have continued their slow 
progress through the EU’s legislative process. Notably, the capital requirements directive and 
regulation were the topic of intense debate (Commission, 2010a&b; see Buckley, Howarth 
and Quaglia, 2012) and in 2012 the Member States failed to reach a final agreement on the 
package details.  
 
The second half of 2012 was dominated by debates surrounding the construction of an EU 
Banking Union. In June 2012, the European Council and euro area summit agreed to deepen 
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Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) creating ‘Banking Union’ (Euro area statement, 
2012) which was to be based on five components: a single rulebook; a single framework for 
banking supervision; a common deposit guarantee scheme; a single framework for the 
managed resolution of banks and financial institutions; and a common backstop for 
temporary financial support. Indeed, the verb officially – and hyperbolically – used was ‘to 
complete’ EMU, suggesting that these elements – rarely discussed in European policy 
making circles prior to 2012 – were the sine qua non of ‘full’ EMU (European Council 
2012). The Member States decided to make the creation of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) the precondition for possible direct recapitalization of banks by the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the funding mechanism created to help tackle the 
sovereign debt crisis.  
 
In September 2012, the Commission adopted a set of legislative proposals as first steps 
towards Banking Union: a regulation giving strong powers for the supervision of all banks in 
the euro area to the European Central Bank (ECB) (Commission, 2012a); a regulation with 
limited specific changes to the regulation setting up the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
to ensure a balance in its decision making structures between the euro area and non-euro area 
member states (Commission, 2012b); and a communication on a roadmap for completing the 
Banking Union over the coming years, covering the single rulebook, common deposit 
protection and a single bank resolution mechanism (Commission, 2012c). The Commission 
and the French government called for an end of year deadline to finalise the first element of 
Banking Union (the transfer of supervisory powers to the ECB). However, it became clear in 
the autumn that implementation would be delayed to the spring of 2014. 
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The proposals for Banking Union in several respects, amount to a radical initiative to stabilise 
the EU’s national banking systems – exposed directly to the sovereign debt crisis – by 
breaking the dangerous link between the high and rising sovereign debt in the euro area 
peripheral Member States and domestic banks, which had come to hold an increasing amount 
of this debt. But Banking Union would also bring about a significant transfer of powers from 
the national to the EU level. While it is unlikely that some elements of the Banking Union 
proposals will be adopted in the near future, the December European Council decision to 
transfer significant supervisory responsibilities to the ECB amounts to a major development 
in European integration history and, more specifically, in the operation of the single market.  
 
This article is organised as follows. Section 1 considers the fragmentation of the single 
market in financial services and the need for Banking Union to address this fragmentation. 
Section 2 outlines the key elements of Banking Union as well as the main outstanding issues 
on which Member States failed to reach an agreement at the December summit. Section 3 
reviews the intergovernmental debate on Banking Union, focusing on the main euro area 
Member States and their priorities. Section 4 looks at the growing reality of a ‘two-speed 
Europe’ in addition to the priorities of the euro area outsiders and notably the United 
Kingdom. Section 5 discusses the stance of the ECB in this policy debate as well as the 
mostly likely changes that the euro area’s central bank will have to undertake in the near 
future. This is followed by a discussion on democratic accountability of the new institutional 
set up, mainly focusing on the position of the European Parliament (EP). 
 
1. The Fragmentation of the European Financial Market 
The impact of the international financial crisis and then the euro area sovereign debt crisis on 
the Single Market in Financial Services has been devastating. The fragmentation of the 
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financial services market in turn affects the ability of the European Central Bank to operate 
effective monetary policy. The ECB thus, not surprisingly, dedicates a sizable part (almost 
half) of the 2012 annual report on Financial Integration in Europe to the benefits of financial 
integration and the deleterious effects of disintegration on Monetary Union and the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Several measures demonstrate the increasing fragmentation 
of the EU’s financial market (ECB, 2012a): a significant increase in the differentiation of 
average unsecured interbank lending rates across the euro area Member States; the 
divergence of euro area Member State lending rates; a decline in unsecured transactions 
undertaken with non-domestic counterparties in the euro area since 2007, both in real terms 
and relative secured transactions; the increased dispersion in credit default swap premiums 
across the euro area Member States for sovereign, bank and telecommunications debt (which 
multiplied from five to nine times from the end of 2009 to early 2012) (ECB, 2012a: 23). 
Banking markets had also become less integrated since 2008 on a range of measures. The 
establishment and activity (measured in assets) of foreign branches and subsidiaries has 
dropped marginally since 2008 (ECB, 2012a: 27). The cross-border merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity of banks – another indicator of market integration – declined sharply from 
2008 and remained low in 2012. The share of loans granted to monetary financial institutions 
(MFIs) by MFIs of other euro area countries stabilized for two years after a drop from 2008 
but then began to decline again in 2011. Although the level of cross-border interbank loans in 
the EU remained relatively high (at around 35 per cent of the total at the end of 2011) this 
was nonetheless a significant decline from the 45 per cent peak in 2007. The dispersion of 
bank interest rates applied to new loans to non financial companies (NFCs) rose considerably 
from the low of 2007 (ECB, 2012a: 29). One glimmer of hope in financial integration 
concerned cross-border lending (euro area and EU more generally) to NFCs and households, 
which was close to peak levels at the end of 2011, albeit at a tiny percentage of the total (5.1 
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and 2.8 per cent respectively) (ECB, 2012a: 28) with domestic lending only one percentage 
point above its lowest level in 2008. On the other hand, two additional sets of figures further 
indicate the fragmentation in euro area/EU financial markets. The cross-border bond holdings 
of euro area MFIs (as a percentage of the total) declined markedly from the middle of the 
2000s with no indication of stabilization prior to 2012 (see Figure 1). In 2005, of the 
government and corporate bonds held by MFIs, over 40 per cent were cross-border. By 2011 
this figure had dropped to 23 per cent. Similarly, the share of cross-border collateral used by 
euro area MFIs had dropped from over 50 per cent of the total to approximately 33 per cent 
(see Figure 2). The euro area periphery (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland) was most 
affected by this retreat to domestic debt, given the declining confidence of non-periphery 
banks in the value of sovereign and corporate debt issued in the periphery. 
 
<Insert Figures 1, 2 & 3 about here> 
 
Figure 1: Cross-border bond holdings of European financial institutions (% of total) 
(end June figures) 
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Source:  ECB (2012a: 22) 
 
 
Figure 2:  Share of domestic and cross-border collateral used in Eurosystem operations 
(percentages) 
 
Source:  ECB (2012a: S10) 
 
 
Figure 3: Share of domestic government debt in banks’ total government debt 
portfolios, selected euro area Member States, June 2010.   
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Sources: EBA data 
 
A destabilizing sovereign debt-domestic bank loop was created in the euro periphery (BIS, 
2011). Higher periphery government spending and rising debt burden increased sovereign 
risk (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012) and threatened to disrupt the collateral function of 
sovereign debt, with a resultant damaging effect on bank funding conditions (BIS, 2011). 
From 2008, the percentage of euro periphery sovereign debt held by domestic banks 
increased markedly as foreign investors – fearing unsustainable euro periphery debt burdens 
– became less willing to purchase this debt or keen to discard it (see Figure 3). Thus, 
increasingly at risk domestic banks came to hold growing amounts downgrading sovereign 
debt, while the ability of sovereigns to bail-out or wind-down domestic banks in an orderly 
manner (to avoid a systemic crisis) diminished as public debt loads rose. There was thus a 
downward spiral in the euro periphery of a rising public debt burden, rising yields and credit 
rating downgrades on sovereign debt, a retreat of foreign investors and an increased holding 
of sovereign debt by domestic banks. In Spain, for example, the bursting of a large real estate 
bubble hit both the economy and government revenues hard, while bringing about the 
collapse of a number of regional lenders (cajas) (Royo 2013). EU institutions and Member 
State governments looked to ways to cut the sovereign debt-domestic bank loop. From the 
outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2008, the quantitative easing (massive 
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sovereign debt purchase) by the Bank of England reduced the dangers of a sovereign debt-
domestic bank link. However, the ECB provided more limited forms of support to the euro 
periphery – performing a reluctant and officially denied ‘lender of last resort’ role. Banking 
Union was presented as necessary step to stabilize euro periphery banking systems and save 
EMU. 
 
2. The main elements of the Banking Union 
‘Banking Union’, as proposed by the European Council in its June conclusions and the 
Commission in its September legislative proposals and communication, has five main 
elements: a single EU rulebook for financial services (and specifically banks); a SSM for 
banks; a single framework on bank resolution; a common deposit guarantee scheme; and a 
common fiscal backstop for struggling banks. A range of scholars and institutions argue that 
all five of these elements should be adopted to ensure that Banking Union creates more 
stability than existing national supervisory systems (Schoenmaker 2012; Ionnidou 2012; IMF 
2013). Senior Commission officials have argued that Banking Union must consist of at least 
four of the five elements, accepting delays to the construction of a common deposit guarantee 
scheme given the political difficulties associated with modifying national schemes (Merlin 
2013). A single rule book, which has been advocated by the EU in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, means a set of fully harmonized EU rules applied consistently across the 
Member States. EU financial legislation is mainly comprised of directives, which need to be 
adopted by the Member States in order to be implemented. Some of these directives contain 
several national discretions, that is they leave open the possibility of national options or 
‘specificities’ in the implementation of EU rules. For example, the Capital Requirements 
Directive III (CRD III) (2006) contained more than 100 national discretions (Quaglia, 2010). 
Partly for this reason, the proposed Capital Requirement IV legislation comprises a directive 
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(Commission 2011a); and a regulation, which imposes a maximum harmonization directly 
applicable in the Members States, therefore leaving little room for manoeuvre in national 
transposition (Commission, 2011b) (see also Buckley, Howarth and Quaglia, 2012; Howarth 
and Quaglia, 2013). 
 
The principal logic behind the establishment of deposit guarantee schemes – which reimburse 
part of the amount of deposits to clients of banks that have failed – is to prevent a ‘bank run’, 
that is panic withdrawals by customers of their banks deposits because of fear of collapse. 
There exists longstanding EU legislation on deposit guarantee schemes to decrease the 
distorting effect to the Single Market created by different national schemes. The Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme Directive of 1994 set the minimum level of deposit protection schemes in 
the EU at €20,000 per depositor (Commission, 1994). However, as the 1994 directive was 
based on minimum harmonization, national deposit guarantee schemes continued to differ in 
several important respects, such as the definition of eligible deposits, the level of cover, the 
types of funding mechanism, and the calculation of bank contributions.  
 
The global financial crisis that accelerated in late 2008 with the collapse of the American 
investment bank Lehman Brothers brought into the spotlight the inadequacy of the 1994 
directive (Ayadi and Lastra, 2010; Quaglia et al. 2009). To begin with, the minimum level 
(€20,000) was too low to placate fears of a bank run. Moreover, the depositor protection 
coverage varied markedly across the EU, ranging from €20,000 in most of the new Member 
States and the UK to more than €100,000 in Italy and France. Furthermore, uncoordinated 
decisions on deposit guarantees taken by some Member States at the height of the crisis in 
late 2008 (notably in Ireland and Germany) worsened the crisis (Quaglia et al. 2009). It 
became evident that different national schemes across the EU potentially distorted level-
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playing field competition and created the potential for ‘bank runs’ because, in the event of 
financial crises, customers in some Member States were prone to shift deposits to a bank 
headquartered in those Member State with more generous guarantee schemes.  
 
At the peak of the international financial crisis in late 2008, the Commission proposed 
legislative changes to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive. These changes – agreed 
hurriedly in 2009 – represented an emergency measure designed to restore depositors’ 
confidence by raising the minimum level of coverage for deposits from €20,000 to €50,000 
and subsequently to €100,000. The need for swift action meant that several controversial 
issues were not tackled and hence the directive contained a clause providing for a broad 
review of all aspects of deposit guarantee schemes. By 2010, the deposit guarantee schemes 
continued to vary markedly across the Member States and only 16 out of 27 applied the 
coverage level of €100 000, or had legislation in place to do so (Commission, 2010).  
 
When the sovereign debt crisis broke out in the euro area in late 2009, the issue of a common 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme came back onto the agenda. In July 2010, the Commission put 
forward a legislative proposal to amend the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive with a view 
to promoting the ‘harmonization and simplification of protected deposits, a faster pay-out, 
and an improved financing of schemes’ (Commission 2010, p. 5). The proposal aimed to 
establish a network of guarantee schemes as a first step towards a ‘pan-European deposit 
guarantee scheme’ to cover all European Union-based banks (ibid., p. 5). Such a pan-
European scheme however presupposed full harmonization of national schemes and could 
only enter into force after a minimum fund of 1.5 per cent of eligible bank deposits had been 
reached in all the Member States. 
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One of the most contentious provisions in the Commission’s proposed 2010 directive was the 
establishment of a mandatory mutual borrowing facility, whereby if a national deposit 
guarantee scheme is depleted, it can borrow from another national fund. Several Member 
States tried to remove this provision during negotiations the directive in the Council 
(interviews with Commission and Permanent Representation officials, Brussels, July 2012). 
The mutual borrowing facility could be the first step towards a pan-EU deposit guarantee 
scheme, which was even more controversial. Indeed, during the preparation of the directive in 
2010, the Commission considered the establishment of a single pan-European scheme. 
However, it soon realised that there were complicated legal issues that needed to be examined 
(Commission, 2010) and therefore the idea of a pan-European scheme was shelved for the 
time being. Ultimately though, the problem was political. The creation of a pan-European 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme would have implied pooling national sovereignty to an extent not 
acceptable to the Member States at that time (i.e., in 2010). The main line of division was 
between the countries that fear that they would become net contributors to the scheme, such 
as Germany, and the countries experiencing banking problems (for example, Spain and 
Ireland) and which were likely to resort to the scheme. Effectively, the German government 
baulked at the prospect of German taxpayers underwriting depositors in other Member States 
with unstable banking systems.2 
 
The issue of deposit guarantee schemes is interlinked with the discussion on a resolution 
framework for banks and financial institutions. ‘Bank resolution’ is the organization of an 
orderly failure, which involves the continuity of banking service. It is an alternative or 
complementary mechanism to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme in the event of bank failure. In 
June 2012, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal for bank recovery and resolution 
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(Commission, 2012d), with the same scope of application as the CRD (hence, credit 
institutions and certain investment firms). The aim of the directive was to create an EU-wide 
framework on bank resolution.  
 
The proposal distinguished between powers of ‘prevention’, ‘early intervention’ and 
‘resolution’. In the case of prevention, banks would be required to draw up recovery plans 
and resolution authorities would be required to prepare resolution plans both at group level 
and for the individual institutions within the group. Authorities could require a bank to 
change its legal or operational structures to ensure that it could be resolved with the available 
tools. Financial groups may enter into intra-group support agreements in the form of loans, or 
the provision of guarantees. The framework envisages early supervisory intervention 
whereby the authorities could require banks to implement measures set out in the recovery 
plan and would have the power to appoint a special manager at a bank for a limited period 
(Commission, 2012d). 
 
The harmonised resolution tools and powers outlined in the proposed directive were designed 
to ensure that national authorities in all Member States had a common toolkit and roadmap to 
manage the failure of banks. Amongst the tools considered, there is the bail-in tool, whereby 
banks would be recapitalised with shareholders wiped out or diluted, and creditors would 
have their claims reduced or converted to shares. ‘Resolution colleges’ would be established 
under the leadership of a clearly identified resolution authority and with the participation of 
the EBA, which would act as binding mediator if necessary (Commission, 2012d, p. 15).  
 
The legislation envisaged the creation of resolution funding, which would raise contributions 
from banks proportionate to their liabilities and risk profiles and would not be used to bail out 
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a bank. There was a link between this piece of legislation and the Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
Directive, which was to provide funding for the protection of retail depositors. Member 
States would be allowed to merge these two funds, provided that the scheme remained able to 
repay depositors in case of failure (Commission, 2012d). The Commission noted that ideally, 
a single pan-European fund should be established with a pan-European resolution authority to 
manage its disbursal, but the absence of a single European banking supervisor and insolvency 
regime would make this unworkable (Commission, 2012d). As in the case of the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme Directive, the obstacles to these far reaching changes were ultimately 
political, with the main line of division running between potential net contributors and net 
beneficiaries. The EU legislative activity on bank recovery and resolution regimes was in line 
with international regulatory initiatives in this field undertaken by the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB, 2011) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010) which 
mainly focused on global systemically important cross border financial institutions.  
 
On the SSM, the Commission proposed that the ECB would be empowered with specific 
supervisory tasks over euro area banks in order to help to strengthen confidence in prudential 
supervision and financial stability. Non-euro Member States would be able to participate in 
the SSM on a voluntary basis (Commission, 2012a). The main issues and political 
negotiations concerning the SSM are discussed in Section 3. 
 
As for the common fiscal backstop, a link was established between Banking Union and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in the event that temporary financial support was 
needed. The ESM is a new EU agency which was to replace the temporary European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). It was established in September 2012 and was to have a 
full lending capacity of €500 billion by 2014. The Member States of the ESM could apply for 
	   14	  
an ESM bailout if they were in financial difficulty or their financial sector was a stability 
threat in need of recapitalization. However, the ESM bailouts were to be based on strong 
conditionality and Member States were required to sign the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ 
which would highlight which reforms needed to be undertaken or fiscal consolidation to be 
implemented in order to restore financial stability. The Commission proposed that the ESM 
be used to support failing banks directly.  
 
There were several open (and potentially sensitive) issues concerning Banking Union (see 
Comporti and Cosimo, 2012; Eliott, 2012; Pisani-Ferry et al., 2012; Veron, 2013). Even on 
the elements agreed in 2012, and notably the SSM, several issues remained. First, both the 
Commission’s September proposals and the December agreement sidestepped the operational 
details of the SSM, and notably the relationship between the ECB and national prudential 
supervision and the responsibilities and powers of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) and the relationship between these two bodies. Second, 
many questions remained about the future organization of national supervisory authorities 
given the loss of potential powers. Furthermore, the relationship among national prudential 
authorities in the operation of Banking Union was unclear as was the relationship between 
these authorities and prudential authorities in EU Member States outside the Banking Union 
and those outside the EU.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, the absence of a central EU body responsible for financial crisis 
management and the lack of a common resolution and deposit insurance scheme cast doubt 
over the ability of the euro area to deal effectively with crisis management and resolution. 
The supervisory power of the ECB still needed to be complemented by a single framework 
for resolving banks. At the end of 2012, crisis management and resolution remained a 
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national competence. A crisis management body had not yet been proposed at the EU level. 
Its creation would inevitably be controversial, as it would have to be assigned decision-
making powers with fiscal implications.  
 
3. The (euro area) intergovernmental debate on Banking Union  
 
The debate on Banking Union was characterised by intense intergovernmental negotiations. 
As in many episodes of EU institution-building, the main players were France and Germany, 
as discussed in this section. However, non-euro area Member States, first and foremost the 
UK, were also active in the debate (Section 4), which extended to the ECB and the EP 
(Section 5 and Section 6, respectively). The French, Italian and Spanish governments were 
the main supporters of Banking Union and the need to move quickly.3 The German 
government was more guarded: it raised several objections in the run up to the European 
Council meeting in December and repeatedly pointed out that the need to get the right 
institutional arrangements in place was more important than to proceed speedily.4 At the 
October European Council, German Chancellor Angela Merkel scuppered President François 
Hollande’s ambitious deadline for an agreement on Banking Union by the end of the year and 
the meeting of euro area Finance Ministers at the start of December failed to overcome major 
on-going obstacles.  
 
Effectively, the Franco-German debate on Banking Union paralleled longstanding debates on 
euro area governance and solutions to the euro area’s sovereign debt crisis. The French 
sought support mechanisms; the Germans reinforced fiscal policy commitments (sustainable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Financial Times, 5 December 2012.  
4 Financial Times, 6 December 2012. 
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Member State budgets). French efforts stemmed from their limited success in convincing the 
Germans to agree to other measures to tackle the crisis. The French had pushed for the 
construction of massive support mechanisms – what David Cameron called the ‘Big 
Bazooka’ – able to purchase debt directly from euro area Member State governments and 
engage in bank recapitalisation.5 The temporary EFSF and the permanent ESM in operation 
from late September were endowed with far less firepower than the French would have 
wanted and more restricted mandates – only the purchase of sovereign debt on secondary 
markets.6  
 
President Hollande for his part insisted that Banking Union and ‘Social Union’ come before 
Political Union – meaning reinforced control over national fiscal and macroeconomic policies 
– sought by the Germans.7 President Hollande called for further discussions on Political 
Union only after the European Parliament elections in 2014. Officially, the French supported 
Banking Union because they sought reinforced banking supervision, a euro area wide deposit 
guarantee and a bank resolution fund – that would relieve market worries over unstable banks 
in the euro area periphery holding huge quantities of their government’s sovereign debt. 
French interest in Banking Union also stemmed from a desire to establish a kind of fiscal 
backstop to the euro area – via a lender of last resort style support for banks rather than 
governments per se. Banking Union should thus be seen as old wine in a new bottle. The 
French argued that cutting the sovereign debt–domestic bank loop was crucial in order to 
rebuild international confidence in the value of sovereign debt of the euro area periphery. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Financial Times, 10 October 2011. 
6 For an analysis of France’s EU policies and stances in light of Hollande’s election see 
Lequesne’s contribution to this volume 
7 Euractiv.com, 18 October 2012. 
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late November, European Council president, Herman Van Rompuy, published his paper 
‘Towards a genuine economic and monetary union’ which largely aligned with French policy 
preferences (Van Rompuy, 2012). The Van Rompuy paper called for the adoption of a legal 
framework by early 2013 to enable the ESM to begin direct bank recapitalizations by the 
early Spring. The French also supported the Van Rompuy paper proposal to create a euro area 
wide ‘shock absorption’ fund, effectively an insurance scheme to which all 17 euro area 
countries would contribute. 
 
The underlying German and Northern European concern remained the fiscal backstop and 
being forced into a situation of having to contribute more funds to the ESM in order to bail 
out banks in other countries.8 Already, by late-September, the German, Dutch and Finnish 
governments made it clear that they opposed any agreement to allow the ESM to recapitalise 
banks, without prior agreement on an adequate regulatory and supervisory framework and 
reinforced fiscal policy rules (Finnish Ministry of Finance, 2012). These three governments 
also insisted that the banks in difficulty in those Member States with fragile banking systems 
– notably Spain and Ireland – remained primarily the responsibility of the governments of 
those Member States. The ESM was only to be used to help banks facing difficulties in the 
future, arising under the supervision of the ECB in the new Banking Union.9  
 
The Germans expressed interest in the Van Rompuy paper proposal on a ‘shock absorption 
fund’ provided that funds used to help countries absorb shocks in EMU were limited.10 They 
insisted that any financing come with thick strings attached – effectively contracts signed – 
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requiring budget discipline and reinforced Commission monitoring – similar to the conditions 
imposed by the ECB upon countries whose debt it purchases. There was however no 
agreement on the special euro area fund at the December European Council. 
 
The German and other northern euro area Member State governments were also concerned as 
to the scope of the Banking Union, in particular whether the ECB should directly supervise 
all banks in the euro area or only the main (cross-border) banks. The Germans opposed ECB 
supervision of the country’s public Landesbanks and savings banks.11 These banks were seen 
as having a ‘public’ function in Germany with strong ties to local and regional governments 
and traditionally reliant on them for financial backing – in terms of credit guarantees for the 
Landesbanks (banned since 2007) and long-term covered bond holdings. For these reasons 
German policy-makers preferred them to be subject to national supervision. The Commission 
and the French government pushed for Banking Union to cover all euro area banks. Many 
argued that the division into larger and smaller banks made little economic sense, given that 
banking crises often originated with smaller, fast-expanding banks (such as Spanish cajas) 
(Garicano 2012). The French government expressed concern over unequal treatment of 
Member States given that its banking system was dominated by five very large institutions 
which would all end up being directly supervised by the ECB.12 
 
Some questioned the ability of the ECB to handle the supervision of all 6000 euro area banks 
– as suggested in the European Commission’s September draft of Banking Union – without a 
massive transfer of resources.13 The French and ECB responded that the ECB would only 
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have direct responsibility for the supervision of systemically important banks, leaving the rest 
to national supervisors working according to EU rules. The Germans were also seeking real 
investigation and auditing powers to be assigned to the ECB – but only over the biggest 
banks – while the French preferred a ‘licensing’ system that would enable national 
supervisors to act on behalf of the ECB.  
 
Despite entrenched Franco-German differences on pre-conditions for bank recapitalization, in 
early June, euro area finance ministers agreed up to €100 billion for the recapitalization of 
Spanish banks from the euro area’s bailout funds, without an accompanying austerity 
programme.14 The Germans subsequently appeared to backtrack on this commitment in their 
position on support only to banks with future difficulties under the ECB’s watch. The 
Spanish government feared that the credit line to Spanish banks would count as public debt 
thus reinforcing the sovereign debt-bank link and increasing the likelihood of default.15 
However, in early December, the German government announced that it was willing to 
accept the immediate, and exceptional, recapitalization of four nationalized Spanish banks. 
The EU leaders agreed on a bailout plan for Spanish banks using Spain's ‘Fund for Orderly 
Bank Restructuring’ permitting the transfer of €39.5 billion from the ESM to the Fund. This 
transfer was accompanied by a pledge by Spain to restructure its financial sector. 
Nonetheless, Wolfgang Schäuble, the German Finance Minister, insisted that the ESM would 
not be used for other bank recapitalizations until the Banking Union was in full operation.16  
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At the June European Council, which took place during a period when Spanish and Italian 
sovereign bond yields reached dangerously high levels and the situation of many Spanish 
banks looked particularly fragile, the French secured a commitment of euro area leaders to 
reach an agreement on Banking Union prior to the end of the year. The largest holders of 
Spanish sovereign debt, Spanish banks, looked fragile. However, in late July, the ECB 
President Mario Draghi announced that the bank was ‘ready to do whatever it takes’ to save 
the single currency and would make ‘unlimited’ purchases of sovereign debt of any euro area 
Member State government which agreed to introduce the kinds of austerity reforms 
introduced in the three bailed out, so-called ‘programme’, countries – Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal.17 This helped to bring down bond yields. However, it also reduced pressure on euro 
area Member State governments to agree far-reaching reforms on Banking Union.  
 
In the end, the agreement reached at the December European Council foresaw that the ECB 
would be ‘responsible for the overall effective functioning of the SSM’ and would have 
‘direct oversight of the euro area banks’ (Council 2012, p. 2). This supervision however 
would be ‘differentiated’ and the Bank would carry it out in ‘close cooperation with national 
supervisory authorities’. Direct ECB supervision was to cover those banks with assets 
exceeding €30 billion or those whose assets represent at least 20 per cent of their home 
country's annual GDP.18 This direct supervision would concern approximately 200 euro area 
banks. However, the agreement also permits the ECB to step in, if necessary, and supervise 
any of the 6000 banks in the euro area to bring about the eventual restructuring or closure of 
banks that found themselves in difficulties. The European Council agreed that the SSM 
would allow the ESM to recapitalize banks in difficulties directly, subject to ‘double 
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majority’ voting by both the ECB and the EBA. The SSM was to begin operation on 1 March 
2014 or twelve months following the entry into force of the legislation, whichever is later, 
subject to operational arrangements (Council, 2012). 
 
 
The EU leaders called upon EU co-legislators to adopt a directive on a Common European 
Resolution Fund (to be financed by banks) and the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive by 
June 2013, with implementation ‘by the Member States as a matter of priority’ (European 
Council, 2012, p.3). The Member State governments failed to agree how these bank 
contributions should be calculated (for example, on a proportional basis of bank capital). The 
December European Summit was never likely to agree on a pan-European deposit guarantee 
scheme which would allow savings to be protected anywhere in the Union or a Union-wide 
resolution fund to which banks would have to contribute. The German government made 
clear its opposition to the mutualisation of debt, hidden transfer payments and the liability of 
German taxpayers for foreign bank resolution or for deposit guarantees in other EU Member 
State banks.19 The goal of full Banking Union by 2014 appeared increasingly unrealistic.  
 
4. Banking Union and non-euro area Member States: The reinforcement of a ‘two-
speed’ EU 
 
The euro-outsiders interested in participating in the SSM were opposed to the European 
Commission’s proposed regulation of September which placed the ECB at the centre of the 
mechanism. The wording of the draft suggested that non-euro Member States would be 
excluded from decision-making as they lacked a vote on the ECB’s Governing Council. The 
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Commission’s draft also appeared explicitly to limit membership by defining ‘participating 
Member State’ as a ‘Member State whose currency is the euro’ (Commission, 2012a). The 
euro-outsiders were supported by the EP’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee which 
formed its own position on the status of the ten EU Member States not in the euro area, 
deciding that 'opt-in' countries should be able to sit on a new ECB supervisory board with 
equal voting powers but not on the decision-making Governing Council.20 The December 
Council agreement on the SSM satisfied some euro-outsider concerns. The revised regulation 
changed the definition of ‘participating Member State’ to ‘a Member State whose currency is 
the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which has established a close 
cooperation’, defined as adopting the necessary legal framework and cooperating with the 
ECB along the lines codified in the draft regulation. Opening the SSM to non-euro Member 
States made good sense in that more Member States sharing common supervisory 
frameworks, rules and mechanisms would further strengthen stability.21 Not including them 
would potentially create a more difficult situation in case of (financial) problems and the 
necessity of extra financial assistance. Furthermore, if different rules were to apply in these 
Member States, the Banking Union might find itself confronted with regulatory and 
supervisory arbitrage on its doorstep.  
 
At the time of writing (April 2013) most non-euro Member State governments have yet to 
take a definitive position on participation in Banking Union and they are weighing up the 
pros and cons of membership (see also, Darvas and Wolff, 2013). Amongst the reasons 
provided to support membership, participation in the SSM was seen in terms of improving 
the credibility of national prudential arrangements, overseen by the ECB. The ECB would 
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possess information about the banks’ headquarters and subsidiaries, allowing more effective 
supervision and decision-making. Furthermore, the banking systems of the Central and 
Eastern European Member States were dominated by foreign institutions: non-participation in 
Banking Union might have a devastating effect on domestic banks as depositors shifted their 
accounts to banks headquartered in Banking Union Member States. There were also several 
reasons not to participate in Banking Union. Non-euro Member States were worried about 
their second-class status, with limited decision-making power as compared to euro area 
members. The ECB might be less prone to focus on the risks building in non-euro and 
smaller Member States. The as yet undetermined implications of full Banking Union also 
encouraged some non-euro Member States to adopt a cautious position on the SSM.  
 
The majority of non-euro Member States either sought to enter Banking Union or adopted a 
‘wait and see’ policy. This included Denmark, which had a formal opt-out on EMU. By the 
December European Council, it was clear that the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Czech 
Republic would opt not to participate in the SSM. The British position is discussed below. 
The Swedish government’s decision not to participate in Banking Union owed largely to the 
fact that no major banks in the country were owned by banking groups headquartered in 
another EU Member State (Darvas and Wolff, 2013). The Swedish government also 
expressed concern as to the second-class position of non-euro Member States in the SSM.22 
Finland and Estonia – with banking systems dominated by Swedish-owned institutions, such 
as the Hansabank subsidiary of Swedbank – had a strong vested interest in reaching a 
compromise to ensure Swedish participation. Latvia and Lithuania, also dominated by 
subsidiaries of Swedish banks, had less interest in joining Banking Union given Swedish 
non-membership, although Latvia’s intention to enter the euro area in 2014 pushed its 
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government to support the form of membership on offer.  
 
The main priority of the British government – which had no intention of joining the SSM – 
was to avoid a potential euro area block within the single financial market. The British, 
supported by seven other non-euro Member State governments, threatened to block Banking 
Union if there were insufficient safeguards put in place for the ‘euro-outsiders’.23 Crucially, 
the British feared the adoption of subsequent financial legislation that would be detrimental 
to the British financial sector. However, the broader issue of concern was the satisfactory co-
existence of a more integrated euro area core and the non-core Member States. Banking 
Union became a kind of test case for Britain's role in a two-speed Europe.24 In the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) – the supervisory body responsible for EU-wide bank stress tests – 
the British feared a euro area majority able to impose its rules on non-euro area members. 
Hence, as early as the summer of 2012, the British demanded an EBA voting reform:  that 
any decision by the Authority should be approved by a minimum number of Member States 
outside the Banking Union and thus effectively by a ‘double majority’ of Member States 
inside and outside the Banking Union.  
 
Germany, the Netherlands and Austria all broadly accepted British-led requests for so-called 
‘double majority’ voting. However, most euro area Member States expressed concern that in 
the event that the number of non-Banking Union Member States dwindled, the United 
Kingdom would enjoy effective veto powers.25 The European Commission opposed EBA 
reform because it would result in the creation of two forums for decision-making: those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Financial Times, 8 November 2012. 
24 Financial Times, 13 December 2012. 
25 Financial Times, 8 November 2012. 
	   25	  
inside and outside the euro area.26 The outcome was a compromise involving the creation of a 
double majority system until the number of non-Banking Union Member States dwindled to 
less than four. The European Parliament retained amendment and veto powers on the EBA 
regulation which was to be adopted in 2013. 
 
French policy makers tended to be the least forthcoming towards British requests. French 
support for Banking Union was bolstered by a direct interest to redirect euro trading business 
and other financial services away from the United Kingdom. In January 2009, then-Finance 
Minister Christine Legarde referred to the need for ‘euro area clearing’.27 In February 2009, a 
26 page confidential memo by the Bank of France was leaked.28 The memo advocated the 
creation of a Paris-based clearing house for credit default swaps (CDS) with the explicit aim 
of preventing London from dominating the business. Christian Noyer, the Governor of the 
Bank of France, publicly confirmed the longstanding French position in a 2 December 2012 
interview with the Financial Times: ‘Most of the euro business should be done inside the 
euro area. It’s linked to the capacity of the central bank to provide liquidity and ensure 
oversight of its own currency.’ Other euro area Member States likely agreed on the 
desirability of redirecting financial transactions from London to the euro area but most were 
less overt in expressing this preference. 
 
The French position also reflected longstanding ECB preference on the location of euro-
derivatives clearing, stated as early as 2001 (ECB, 2011c). The ECB recommended 
legislating on this preference for the first time in a July 2011 policy paper (ECB, 2011a) 
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which called for legislation requiring clearing houses to be based in the euro area if they 
handled ‘sizeable amounts’ of (i.e., more than 5 per cent of the clearer’s business was in) a 
euro-denominated financial product. This recommendation came in the context of a long-
standing debate over the control and authorization of clearinghouses in the European Markets 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) on which the British government later won an important 
concession, prohibiting the discrimination against any Member State as a venue for clearing 
services. In September 2011, the British government launched its first lawsuit against the 
ECB through the European Court of Justice on the grounds that the ECB’s policy 
recommendation would restrict the free movement of capital and infringe upon the right of 
establishment. The rule would disadvantage financial services in the United Kingdom and 
could force one of the world’s largest clearing houses – LCH.Clearnet, which far exceeded 
the 5 per cent threshold – to move its euro operations to the euro area.29 At the end of 2012, 
over 40 per cent of euro-denominated transactions took place in London, more than the entire 
euro area combined. Further, the British government remained concerned that the ECB would 
push for new regulation that would contradict British preferences. The ECB responded by a 
clarification of its clearinghouse location policy in a November 2011 document (ECB, 2011c) 
against which, in February 2012, the British government launched a second ‘technical’ legal 
challenge. 
 
5. The European Central Bank and Banking Union 
Prior to the debate on Banking Union, some senior ECB officials (for example, Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa) expressed support for the ECB to take over supervisory functions (Howarth 
and Loedel, 2005). However, this was not an official ECB policy. Nonetheless, the ECB 
endorsed the initial Commission’s proposal of allocating all supervisory competences to the 
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ECB, regardless of the size of banks. President Mario Draghi made clear that being a decisive 
supervisor included oversight of all 6,000 banks to ensure a level playing field.30 But in 
several speeches he also reiterated that day-to-day tasks would remain with national 
supervisors (see for example, ECB, 2012c.). He argued that the ECB should be in a position 
to carry out its new functions ‘in a decisive, firm, complete and strong manner without any 
reputational risks’ and ‘new tasks should not be mixed with [the central bank’s] monetary 
policy tasks – delivering price stability in the medium term – which for [the central bank] 
remains the primary task’ (ECB, 2012c). The ECB welcomed the 13 December agreement on 
the SSM. 
 
The impact of Banking Union upon the size and organization of the ECB remained far from 
clear. In December, senior ECB figures reported the likely need for approximately 500 new 
staff members hired from national supervisory bodies but this was almost certainly an 
underestimate.31 President Draghi commissioned a private consultancy firm to prepare a 
report (published in January 2013) on the necessary steps to prepare the ECB for Banking 
Union. The firm recommended that the ECB should more than double its staff, with an 
expansion of almost two thousand, to be allocated to the operation of the SSM, by 2017 – the 
date by which the ECB would be supervising up to 200 banks directly.32 By comparison, 
there were approximately 1500 officials working in prudential supervision in Germany (in the 
Bundesbank and BaFin, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority).  
 
The consultancy also noted the dangers of power struggles with national authorities (some of 
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which are not central banks) over prudential supervision.33 The consultancy firm proposed 
that national representatives on supervisory boards should abstain on issues relating directly 
to their national banks, so as to ensure that decisions are objective and pan-European. It was 
also uncertain where power over supervision would rest in the ECB, although all were agreed 
that safeguards were needed to ensure a clear separation of the banks’ monetary policy and 
supervisory policy. However, there were on-going concerns about the operation of the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – the body established in 2011 to monitor trends in 
European financial markets – which was chaired by the ECB president and supported by the 
analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical assistance of the ECB. Critics claimed that 
the close ECB-ESRB ties already gave the central bank a role in macro-economic supervision 
that could compromise its monetary policy functions.34 
 
The December agreement involved the creation of a planned mediation committee between 
the banking supervisory board and the ECB Governing Council. This was a last-minute 
compromise introduced to satisfy the German government which was opposed to assigning 
automatic responsibility to the ECB for mishaps it could not directly supervise.35 It was 
agreed that the mediation committee would intervene when the banking supervisory board 
(which would likely include both euro area members and non-members) disagreed with the 
ECB’s Governing Council on the supervision of a specific bank. The consultancy hired by 
the ECB proposed that the administrative head of the supervisory arm should be a member of 
the central bank’s Executive Board who would also serve as a vice-chair of the supervisory 
board. This powerful figure would likely come from one of the larger Member States, with 
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Danièle Nouy, a senior official from the Bank of France a likely candidate.36 
 
On the Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme, the ECB supported the development of 
common support tools to manage the failure of financial institutions (ECB, 2012b). It argued 
that a common deposit guarantee scheme could help to maintain financial stability by 
discouraging speculation against individual member states or institutions of the euro area. 
The ECB ‘fully supports the development of a recovery and resolution framework’ (ECB, 
2012b, p. 1). In this respect it called for a rapid establishment of an Independent European 
Resolution Mechanism (ECB, 2012b, p. 2). ECB President Draghi declared himself confident 
that the resolution mechanism would be in place when the SSM enters into force.37 However, 
Draghi claimed that even if this mechanism was not in place, a negative assessment by the 
SSM of the viability of a bank, ‘would likely’ force national governments to undertake 
corrective measures38. The ECB adopted a positive position on the use of ESM funds to 
support banks, whilst its general position had always been that financial assistance should be 
conditioned by fiscal and macroeconomic reforms (as in the case of Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal).39 
 
The Bundesbank maintained its reputation for rigorous critique on the euro crisis and mooted 
reforms by issuing an opinion that the December deal on the ECB’s role in supervision 
lacked ‘a long-term solid legal basis’ and that the mediation committee operating between the 
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bank supervisor and the Governing Council could be attacked in the courts.40 The 
Bundesbank President, Jens Weidmann, also challenged the logic of transforming the ECB 
into a prudential supervisor and expressed concern that the ECB’s new supervisory role 
would not be sufficiently separate from its monetary policy role (and the goal of price 
stability) to ensure independence.41 Many other observers and policy makers, including the 
EP’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee expressed similar concerns.42 Weidmann, 
however, argued that at best the ECB should operate as a transitional supervisor, while 
another entirely independent body was set up. Weidmann was also opposed to the creation of 
a ‘resolution’ authority able to use taxpayer money to shut down banks, until a fund based on 
bank contributions was established, on the grounds that this would spread risks to taxpayers 
yet without adequate democratic controls. 
 
5. Banking Union and (the lack of) democratic oversight 
Members of the European Parliament from the two main party groups were broadly 
supportive of Banking Union and called for adoption of the legal framework by the end of 
2012 and for implementation to start in 2013.43 However, MEPs also expressed the concern 
that the EP had been side-lined in the design of the Banking Union proposals and that 
democracy would suffer as a consequence.44 The EP only possessed consultative power over 
the SSM regulation and other potential legislation to reinforce the powers of the ECB – 
although the EP held equal legislative power with the Council on the directive amending the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Financial Times, 17 December 2012. 
41 Financial Times, 27 September 2012; WirtschaftsWoche, 22 December 2012. 
42 Financial Times, 29/30 November 2012. 
43 EUObserver, 29 November 2012. 
44 EUObserver 29 November 2012. 
	   31	  
powers of the EBA in the context of Banking Union. MEPs thus pushed to maintain an 
important role in negotiations and for Member States to treat the two pieces of legislation 
(SSM and EBA powers) equally. MEPs referred to the negotiations in 2011 on the ‘Six Pack’ 
reforms to economic governance as a precedent on which the EP enjoyed de facto co-decision 
even though Consultation procedures applied to the reforms.45 MEPs demanded transparency 
both in the negotiations on Banking Union and in the future operation of ECB supervisory 
powers and threatened to block new rules for the EBA if the Council (Member States) 
refused to negotiate on its SSM demands.46  
 
On 29 November, the EP’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee adopted its 
amendments of the European Commission’s September legislative package (EP, 2012) 
focusing in large part upon improving the democratic accountability of the SSM. The 
Committee demanded a veto over the nominee for chair of the SSM’s board (to be located 
within the ECB), and that MEPs should have greater say over the SSM’s budget and full 
investigative powers over the new board and its operations. At present the EP has no 
confirmation power over the appointment of ECB Executive Board members, which MEPs 
have compared unfavourably with the power of Congress over the confirmation of nominees 
to the US Federal Reserve Board (Howarth and Loedel, 2005; Jabko, 2003). The new 
supervisory board would be required to report to the EP and national parliaments. MEPs also 
forwarded specific positions on a range of matters. MEPs demanded that the SSM regulation 
include conflict of interest provisions which could prevent members of the SSM's board from 
also having a mandate as a national regulator and blocking supervisory officials from 
entering (or returning) to banking jobs (thus avoiding the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon). 
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MEPs also recommended that the EBA be assigned more powers to carry out stress tests and 
investigations and that it be relocated to Frankfurt – in order to tighten the Authority’s links 
with the ECB and avoid institutional overlap.  
 
Conclusion 
Banking Union – if adopted in its entirety as proposed by the European Commission – would 
be the most important step in European integration since the launch of Economic and 
Monetary Union. The adoption of the SSM is, in itself, one of the most significant leaps 
forward since 1999. Banking Union can be seen as a necessary response to the ‘asymmetric’ 
design of EMU (a Monetary Union with a limited form of EU) and to the fragmentation of 
the single financial market. Banking Union can be seen as a crisis-driven attempt to address 
several important issues that were side-stepped or papered over during the negotiations 
leading to the Maastricht Treaty, principally the allocation of supervisory responsibilities to 
the ECB and the creation of a fiscal backstop in the euro area. Other issues, notably the need 
for a single rule book and the harmonization of deposit guarantee schemes, stemmed from the 
incomplete nature of the single financial market – despite its heralded re-launch in the early 
2000s. The limited integration of financial services markets (and notably banking markets) 
even after 13 years of EMU is a major weakness in the Single Market. Finally, other issues, 
such as the need for a common deposit guarantee and a resolution fund/authority for the euro 
area, were highlighted by the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. The further 
disintegration of financial markets since 2007 is the most significant on-going impact of these 
crises upon the Single Market. The Banking Union proposals are a direct response to this 
disintegration and thus should be seen as much in terms of reinforcing the Single Market as 
stabilising banks and EMU.  
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In the summer of 2012, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) came out as a vocal champion 
of Banking Union as an essential step to resolve the sovereign debt crisis (Goyal et al., 2013; 
IMF, 2012; IMF, 2013). Like the Bundesbank, the IMF expressed its concern over a ‘half-
finished’ project, arguing that the SSM, the single resolution mechanism with common fiscal 
backstops (mutualisation), a single authority with the power to shut down banks and common 
safety nets were all required to ensure a successful Banking Union. The creation of an SSM 
prior to the creation of a credible fiscal backstop would leave the former at risk, resulting in 
‘an architecture that is inferior to the current national one’ (Goyal et al., 2013, p. 22). 
 
The sudden push on Banking Union by the European Commission and certain Member State 
governments, and notably the French, reflects the limited success of EU-level fiscal policy 
reinforcement and support mechanism construction in terms of building confidence in the 
stability of EMU. The half-hearted nature of reform to date owes to fundamental 
disagreements between France and Germany on how to tackle the crisis. Banking Union has 
thus been embraced by many as an alternative route to stability: a European Holy Grail. Yet 
the Banking Union to be agreed in 2013 was as likely to be an uncomfortable compromise as 
previous reforms adopted to resolve the sovereign debt crisis. German opposition to the 
mutualisation of financial support for banks would be difficult to overcome. While a major 
step forward in European economic integration, the reforms adopted would likely fall short of 
the silver bullet hoped by many to bring the sovereign debt crisis to an end. 
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